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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4758 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARVIN ANDRE HENDY, 
a/k/a Donald M. Peterson 
 
Marvin Andre Hendy, 
                                         Appellant 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District Court of  New Jersey 
District Court  No. 03-09-cr-00485-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 14, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 16, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 Marvin Andre Hendy, a citizen and native of Guyana, entered this 
country in 1984 pursuant to a visa.  After he was convicted of several armed 
robberies, he was deported in 1993.  Hendy then illegally returned to the United 
States, only to be deported again in 2004.  Undeterred, he reentered the United 
States.  Although he was apprehended by law enforcement authorities in 2007, he 
avoided deportation proceedings by providing a false name.  In 2009, however, an 
indictment was returned by a grand jury charging Hendy with illegal reentry after 
deportation in violation of Title 8, U.S.C. §§ 1326 (a) and (b)(2).   
 Hendy exercised his right to a jury trial.  During trial, he stipulated to 
only one of the elements of the offense of illegally reentering the United States, 
thereby requiring the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
the other elements.  Although Hendy testified, the jury found him guilty as 
charged.  At sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey imposed a 63-month sentence, which fell at the lower end of Hendy’s 
guidelines range.  This timely appeal followed.
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 Hendy contends that the District Court erred at sentencing by failing to 
reduce his offense level by two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 based on his 
acceptance of responsibility.  Hendy acknowledged at sentencing that the 
acceptance of responsibility adjustment is generally not available if a defendant 
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §  3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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puts the government to its burden of proof.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. 
Nonetheless, he argued that the adjustment was warranted because he had 
stipulated to one element of the case and did not vigorously oppose the 
government’s proof of the other elements of the offense of illegal reentry.  After 
presenting further remarks about the guideline calculation and in an effort to set 
forth a revised guideline range for the Court’s consideration, Hendy’s counsel 
asked the Court if it accepted his argument.  The Court indicated that it was not 
persuaded.  
 According to Hendy, the District Court erred by failing to find that he met 
the requirements for a § 3E1.1 adjustment.  Whether a defendant has accepted 
responsibility is a factual finding reviewable for clear error.  United States v. 
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).  In light of the District Court’s 
familiarity with the trial proceeding, which included Hendy’s testimony, and the 
argument offered at sentencing, we find no error, clear or otherwise, in the Court’s 
factual determination that Hendy did not merit an acceptance of responsibility 
adjustment.   
 We turn to Hendy’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence.  We 
review for procedural error and substantive reasonableness, applying an abuse of 
discretion standard to both inquiries.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Hendy contends that his sentence is procedurally 
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unreasonable because the District Court:  (1) did not rule on Hendy’s request for a 
variance; (2) failed to address his argument that it should grant a variance because 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2’s 16-level enhancement lacked an empirical justification, and its 
harshness had been recognized by the courts as evidenced by the percentage of 
downward departures granted at sentencings; and (3) did not adequately explain its 
sentence.   
 The sentencing transcript before us belies Hendy’s contentions.  After 
discussing several of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court 
declared that the “characteristics of this defendant would not warrant the kind of 
lenient sentence that counsel for the defendant has argued for.”  By our lights, this 
constituted a ruling on his request for a variance.  Immediately following this 
ruling, the Court acknowledged Hendy’s assertion that application of § 2L1.2 was 
harsh and resulted in disparate sentences.  She declined, however, to deviate, as 
courts had in other illegal reentry cases, on the basis that a sentence within the 
guideline range of 63 to 78 months seemed “perfectly appropriate in [Hendy’s] 
case.”  Finally, the Court explained that given all the sentencing factors and in light 
of Hendy’s characteristics, a guideline sentence was “as lenient a sentence as the 
court could, in good conscience, impose.”  In sum, the District Court’s sentence 
was procedurally sound.   
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 Finally, Hendy contends that his within-guideline sentence is 
substantively unreasonable.  We disagree.  Because it cannot be said that “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Hendy] for 
the reasons the district court provided[,]” we will affirm.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
